Faith and Reason
Keith Allen Korcz
There are a number of questions that might be raised about religious faith, but for the purposes of this paper, we will focus on the following question:
Can faith provide a good argument for the existence of the theistic God?
But before we can begin to address this question directly, we need to have some account of the nature of religious faith, in order to focus our thoughts.
I. What Is Religious Faith?
Presumably, the best way to answer this question is to determine what those who profess religious faith take their faith to be, and so this is what we'll do. There are numerous different characterizations of religious faith. Here are some examples from believers within the theistic tradition:
1. "Now we shall have a right definition of faith if we say that it is a steady and certain knowledge of the divine benevolence towards us, which is founded upon the truth of the gracious promise of God in Christ, and is both revealed to our minds and sealed in our hearts by the Holy Spirit..." - John Calvin 
2. "Faith is first of all a personal adherence of man to God. At the same time, and inseparably, it is a free assent to the whole truth that God has revealed. [...] Faith is certain. It is more certain than all human knowledge because it is founded on the very word of God who cannot lie. [...] 'Faith seeks understanding': it is intrinsic to faith that a believer desires to know better the One in whom he has put his faith ..." - Catechism of the Catholic Church 
3. "Now faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen." - Hebrews 11:1 
4. "Faith is the state of being ultimately concerned ... If it claims ultimacy it demands the total surrender of him who accepts this claim, and it promises total fulfillment even if all other claims have to be subjected to it or rejected in its name." - Paul Tillich 
5. "Faith is to believe, on the word of God, what we do not see, and its reward is to see and enjoy what we believe." - St. Augustine 
6. "Faith is the acceptance of Jesus Christ and commitment of the entire personality to Him as Lord and Saviour." - Southern Baptist Convention 
7. "Faith that Christ has genuinely done his work was part of what Luther meant by faith, which so far is faith in a fact intellectually conceived of. But this is only one part of Luther's faith, the other part being far more vital. This other part is something not intellectual but immediate and intuitive, the assurance, namely, that I, this individual I, just as I stand, without one plea, etc., am saved now and forever." - William James 
8. "That is why those to whom God has given religious faith by moving their hearts are very fortunate, and feel quite legitimately convinced, but to those who do not have it we can only give such faith through reasoning, until God gives it by moving their heart, without which faith is only human and useless for salvation." - Blaise Pascal 
9. "The faith James criticizes is "head belief" - mere intellectual assent to facts. Such "faith" does not lead to holy living and hence is worthless, or "dead" (James 2:20). It has no saving value. When we read about "faith" in the other epistles, whole-hearted trust in Christ is in view. This is the faith on the basis of which God credits a believer with righteousness and which leads its possessor to want a holy life." - Paul Little 
10. "In [faith] the object of theology claims, astonishes, concerns, and commits any given man in such a way that he can actually live, inquire, think, speak, and totally exist as a theologian. [...] Faith in this object, therefore, is not hypothetical and problematic knowledge. It is quite basically a most intensive, strict, and certain knowledge." - Karl Barth 
A variety of themes in the above statements about faith can be distinguished:
The Belief Theme: many of the above characterizations of religious faith include a belief that something is the case, e.g., that God exists, or that they are saved, etc. (in particular, 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10).
The Revelation Theme: some of them include a supernatural element, describing faith as being based on a direct revelation or intervention from God (1, 5, 10 and perhaps 8).
The Certainty Theme: many indicate that faith is a matter of certainty or being convinced (1, 2, 8, 10).
The Emotive Theme: an emotional element is often included, variously described as faith being in the heart (1, 8), being a desire (2), a hope (3), a personal commitment (2, 4, 6, 10), or a trust or assurance (7, 9).
The Non-Evidential Theme: some suggest that faith occurs where there is a lack of or even conflict with ordinary evidence (3, 4, 5, 8, 9).
Finally, many of these authors would go on to say that faith is at least necessary to salvation.
We can use these themes to explore possible answers to our question.
II. Can Faith Provide A Good Argument For The Existence Of The Theistic God?: The First Three Themes
The Belief Theme alone obviously won't support the claim that God exists, because merely believing that some object or being outside of our own minds exists will not make it exist.  We have all experienced believing something, e.g., that the car keys are on the kitchen table, only to discover that our belief was mistaken. But if our beliefs made such things so, they could never be mistaken!
The Revelation Theme suggests a fairly straightforward argument for the existence of God: if God causes faith, then God must exist, because things which don't exist cannot cause anything. Of course, it cannot simply be assumed that God causes faith, because this would beg the question. Some argument would have to be presented to show that it was in fact God, and not something else (e.g., some other supernatural being, one's upbringing, or one's own emotional needs, etc.) that caused the faith. One possible argument would be that one experiences God as one experiences the faith he causes. However, we shall not pursue this argument here but return to it later, because it is traditionally classified as the argument from experience, which will be discussed later in the course.
The Certainty Theme also suggests an argument for the existence of God. If faith makes one certain that God exists, isn't that good reason to believe that God exists? The answer depends on what is meant by 'certain'. It is crucial to distinguish feeling certain from being certain. 
People sometimes feel certain that they, for example, did poorly on a test, only to find out later they did quite well. Other times we are certain we, e.g., were to meet someone for lunch at 2:00, only to discover that the appointment was for 1:00. In short, we have all felt certain that something is the case only to find out we were mistaken. Feeling certain is a psychological state of feeling sure that a claim is true. But as these examples illustrate, feeling certain is not enough to make it the case that what we believe is true.
By contrast, being certain about a claim involves knowing that it is logically impossible for one to be mistaken about it. For example, perhaps one can be certain of one's own existence.
Knowing that something is the case requires more than just believing it to be true. For example, one day you might arbitrarily decide to believe that the price of peas in Outer Mongolia is twenty cents a bushel. We wouldn't want to say that you knew that the price of peas is twenty cents a bushel, even if it turned out, by a lucky accident, that your belief is true. In addition to having a true belief, knowing something requires that your belief about it is based on good reasons, such as strong inductive or sound deductive arguments, or an appropriate sensory experience, etc. So if the certainty of faith is to involve knowledge, it must provide a good reason for the belief - belief itself is not sufficient. So, if faith is more than just feeling certain, but involves being certain, then faith must be supported by good reasons. On this view, faith is the result of good reasons, but is not itself a good reason. Good reasons would need to be provided for one's faith.
III. Can Faith Provide A Good Argument For The Existence Of The Theistic God?: The Last Two Themes
A. Fideism and Good Reasons
Using reason, or being rational, involves believing in accordance with good reasons. Good Reasons for a belief are whatever indicates that the belief is true, or at least probably true. Reasons may include deductive arguments, inductive arguments, perceptions, etc. Here are some examples of beliefs supported by good reasons:
Belief: There is a red car in the driveway.
Good Reason: I am looking at the red car in the driveway (one might also add: I have no good reason to believe that I am currently hallucinating, there do not appear to be any unusual lighting conditions which might, e.g., make a white car appear red, it is very unlikely that someone created a cardboard car facsimile and placed it in the driveway in order to trick me, etc.).
Belief: Christopher Columbus visited The Americas in 1492.
Good Reasons: I have read in reliable books that the consensus of experts in history, on the basis of their research, agree that this is the case.
Belief: The Earth orbits the sun.
Good Reasons: I have read in reliable books that the consensus of experts in astronomy, on the basis of their research, agree that this is so.
A Philosophical Aside:
One thing worth noting about the latter two examples is that they appeal to the consensus of experts in the field in question, and not just one or two. The reason for this is that every field has its loons, and you can always find someone somewhere who will say anything. But if the consensus of experts, which will usually consist of a large number of people with very diverse backgrounds, has agreed on an issue, then it becomes much more likely that the claim is true. This is why appeals to just one authority are considered fallacious appeals to authority.
Where faith involves being guided by good reasons, such that the beliefs one has faith in are also supported by adequate evidence, then there is obviously no conflict between faith and reason. But where faith is primarily an emotional matter, as indicated in the Emotive Theme, or faith involves belief independent of or even contrary to one's evidence, as in the Non-Evidential Theme, then a conflict may arise. It is these latter two themes that we will be concerned with here.
We can define fideism as the view that religious beliefs are not subject to rational evaluation, but are instead a matter of irrational faith. But fideists differ with regard to what degree they reject the use of good reasons.
What we could call moderate fideists believe that only some religious beliefs are contrary to any good reasons we could have, and therefore must be based on faith. Moderate fideists would include St. Augustine (354-430), St. Anselm (1033-1109) and St. Thomas Aquinas (c.1225-1274). For example, St. Aquinas states that, "... faith presupposes natural knowledge, just as grace does nature and all perfections that which they perfect." 
What we could call full fideists believe that relying on good reasons is fine for science, history, everyday life, and such, but should not be applied to any religious belief. Full fideists would include the contemporary philosopher D. Z. Phillips.
What we could call radical fideists are more suspicious of the use of good reasons in general, and espouse a more general anti-intellectualism, or opposition to reliance on good reasons. Persons who have at times seemed to espouse a radical fideism would include early Church Father Tertullian (c.160-230), Christian existentialist Soren Kierkegaard (1813-1855), Martin Luther (1483-1546), and many contemporary fundamentalists as well.
For example, Martin Luther states that, "... he who would deal with the doctrines of the Christian faith [should] not pry, speculate, and ask how it may agree with reason, but, instead, merely determine whether Christ said it. If Christ did say it, then he should cling to it, whether it harmonizes with reason or not, and no matter how it may sound."  And Tertullian is known to have said, concerning the death and resurrection of Christ, "I believe because it is absurd; it is certain because it is impossible!" 
Next we will examine some arguments for various kinds of fideism, and then we'll examine some arguments against fideism.
B. Some Arguments For Fideism
There are two general strategies for arguing for fideism. The first is to appeal to authority, and the second is to argue that it is rational to be a fideist. We'll evaluate examples of both kinds of argument.
1. Appeals to Authority
a. The Bible Requires Fideism
Sometimes it is argued that the Bible requires some sort of fideism, and that we ought to accept what the Bible states. One issue here is whether the Bible is trustworthy in the first place, but we shall set this issue aside for now and see whether in fact the Bible demands some form of fideism.
One passage which appears to support a radical fideist viewpoint occurs in 1 Corinthians 1:19-20, which states, "For it is written, I will destroy the wisdom of the wise, and will bring to nothing the understanding of the prudent. Where is the wise? where is the scribe? where is the disputer of this world? hath not God made foolish the wisdom of this world?" And Tertullian, to defend his fideism, quoted Colossians 2:8: "Beware lest any man spoil you through philosophy and vain deceit, after the tradition of men, after the rudiments of the world, and not after Christ." (However, regarding Colossians 2:8, it may well be the case that the "philosophy" in question may not be a reference to reason, but instead a reference to alternative religious traditions, and this is suggested by the context of the chapter. )
On the other hand, some passages in the Bible seem to support a demand for good reasons. For example, in the Book of Judges 6:12-22, God and/or an angel (the story is not consistent) appears to Gideon and tells him to go smite the Midianites. Gideon is skeptical, having just been defeated by the Midianites, and asks that God perform a miracle to prove it's really him. He then has God wait while Gideon goes and gets some goat meat, soup and some cakes. God performs the requested miracle by making the meat and cakes burst into flame, and only then Gideon is convinced. Note that, according to the story, God does not simply insist that Gideon have faith, but accepts and meets Gideon's demand for evidence. Later in the same chapter (6:37-40), Gideon tests God again, insisting that God verify that he is with Gideon by leaving out a fleece over night, and asking God to make it wet with dew while the ground around it stays dry. God does this. Still wanting to make sure, the next night he asks God to make the fleece dry, but the ground around it wet with dew, and again God does so. In another example, Jesus performs miracles to provide evidence of his own divinity, as in Matthew 9:6, when he cures palsy "... that ye may know that the Son of man hath power on earth to forgive sins ..." 
Perhaps the most plausible conclusion is that the Bible is open to a variety of interpretations on this issue.
b. The Argument That Doubt Is A Sin
Sometimes it is argued that we should believe that God exists, whether this belief is rational or not, because to doubt the existence of God would be a sin or a morally bad thing. English professor and Christian apologist C. S. Lewis (1898-1963) offers the following analogy of a friend late for an appointment:
"It is one thing to discuss ... whether So-and-So will join us tonight, and another to discuss this when So-and-So's honour is pledged to come and some great matter depends on his coming. In the first case it would be merely reasonable, as the clock ticked on, to expect him less and less. In the second, a continued expectation far into the night would be due to our friend's character if we had found him reliable before. Which of us would not feel slightly ashamed if one moment after we had given him up he arrived with a full explanation of his delay? We should feel that we ought to have known him better." 
Lewis' idea is that just as such trust in a friend (despite the contrary evidence) is essential to friendship, such trust in God is essential to having a proper, personal relationship with God. Thus, to doubt God's existence, even if given good evidence to do so, would be a betrayal of trust, and a rejection of God's gift of faith (as described in the Revelation Theme).
However, as Lewis recognizes, all of this assumes that we know that God exists, that God wishes this sort of trusting relationship, etc. Thus, Lewis' argument can't be successful in showing that we should be fideists with regard to these issues.
But does his argument succeed in showing that one should be a fideist with regard to other sorts of religious issues, given that one is personally committed to the view that God exists? Consider the story of the devout man trapped in a terrible flood. He is on the roof of his house, the flood waters just a few feet below where he is standing. A neighbor paddles by in a canoe and offers him a lift, but the man refuses, saying that he has complete faith and trust that God will not let him drown in the flood. Next, a rescue team in a power boat sails up to the man and tosses him a line. The man refuses, saying that he has no need of human help, that God will protect him. A short while later, a rescue helicopter comes by and tosses him a line, but the man remains steadfast in his faith. Finally, he is drowned in the flood waters, and rises up into heaven. The man asks God, "How could you let me die when I had such faith and trust in you?" and God says, "What are you talking about? I sent two boats and a helicopter to save you!"
The point of this story is that, while people are often deeply convinced that they know what trusting God requires of them, they can easily be mistaken. Thus, the objection goes, it is not clear how we could distinguish well-founded trust in God from a completely misguided trust. Lewis' argument assumes that we would know what to expect from God just as easily as we would know what to expect from a human friend. But, given the unique sort of being God is understood to be (all-knowing, perfectly good, etc.), and the relative limitations of humans, this is highly unlikely. Many people accept the views of some authority (whether the Bible or a religious leader) as to what God expects or desires, and Lewis just takes these for granted. But the diversity of opinions on this question indicates how difficult determining God's intentions must be. As the famous French philosopher (and devout Christian) Rene Descartes (1596-1650) put it, "... I consider the customary search for final causes to be totally useless in physics; there is considerable rashness in thinking myself capable of investigating the impenetrable purposes of God." 
2. Arguments that it is Rational to be a Fideist
a. The Argument That Religious Truths Are Beyond Reason
Some people say that religious truths are beyond reason. For example, a line of reasoning often given in support of radical fideism is that we cannot rely on our powers of reason because they have been corrupted by original sin. The idea is that, according to the Bible (which may be interpreted literally or figuratively on this issue), when Adam and Eve were kicked out of the Garden of Eden, part of their punishment was that the ability of their progeny to reason was corrupted. Thus, we cannot rely on our powers of reasoning when it comes to religious matters, and perhaps other matters as well, because they will lead us away from the truth.
In order to better understand this view, we need to understand what it means for something to be beyond reason. We said that a good reason for a belief indicates that it is true, or at least probably true. A bad reason for a belief would be one that fails to indicate that it is true, or at least probably true. For a claim to literally be beyond reason, then, would be for it to be such that no reason would either indicate that it is true or fail to indicate that it is true. But this is logically impossible. For something to literally be beyond reason, then, is logically impossible.
However, maybe the idea of something being beyond reason is not intended literally, but metaphorically. Sometimes, for example, what people have in mind when they say that something is beyond reason is that humans lack the ability to reason about it and thereby discover the truth about it. Given that good reasons are things that indicate truth, this would imply that there is no way to discover the truth about it. But theists wish to avoid this view. Theists claim that there are many things that humans can know about God, e.g., that he exists, that we should honor and respect him, that it is appropriate to pray to him but not to curse him, etc. To embrace the view that we could know none of these things would be to reject traditional theism.
b. The Parity Defense
The main idea of the Parity Defense is to argue that reason in general is a matter of irrational faith, and, since reason is acceptable, so is irrational faith that religious beliefs are true. This is perhaps the most common sort of defense of fideism.
For example, it often is argued that scientific reasoning involves presuppositions which are simply a matter of faith. The scientist is said to assume as a matter of faith, for example, that scientific questions have intelligible answers, that the universe is orderly, i.e., that events are caused rather than happening randomly, that our sense perceptions are reliable, that induction is reliable, etc. 
We'll look at two different versions of this argument, the Argument From Trust and The Argument From Induction.
The Argument from Trust was presented by Cardinal John Henry Newman, an influential English theologian who lived from 1801 to 1890.  Newman argues that religious faith, understood as a kind of trust that God exists, is just as rational as relying on our own memory, or the testimony of others. He argues that we must trust that our memory does not systematically deceive us, that our ability to reason is adequate, that our sensory faculties (sight, hearing, etc.) are reliable, and that the testimony of others can be relied upon. An example of the latter might be our trust in the testimony of those who tell us that China exists, even though we have never been there ourselves. Such trust is essential for getting about in the world, and seems perfectly rational. But trust is essentially faith. So religious faith, insofar as it is trusting that God exists, may be rational. For example, it would be equally rational to trust the testimony of those who claim to have experienced God as it would be to trust them when they say that China exists.
As Newman notes, trust in the testimony of others and such is not a blind trust, i.e., one that does not rely on good reasons. Thus, we might well come to believe that the testimony of a particular person is not to be trusted if, for example, we know that the person has often lied in the past. Similarly, we may check up on our memory of what was said in class by checking our written notes to ensure that what we remember is accurate. Similarly, then, we would want additional evidence of the accuracy of the testimony of those who claimed to experience God, evidence which goes beyond their mere testimony regarding God. Such evidence could not come from merely trusting that testimony, any more than our reasons for trusting a given bit of testimony from a person can simply be trusting that given bit of testimony from that person, for this would beg the question. But then we must have some additional reason to believe that God exists, aside from the testimony, in order to know that the testimony is trustworthy. Thus, we have an objection to Newman's argument: we do not merely trust testimony and such, but we may reasonably demand additional evidence before doing so. Trust supported by good reasons may be rational. But trust unsupported by good reasons is irrational. And it remains to be seen whether trust in the testimony of those who claim to experience God is supported by good reasons.
Perhaps the best argument that can be made for this view is to appeal to the Problem of Induction, first formulated by the Scottish philosopher David Hume (1711-1776).  We'll call this version of the Parity Defense the Argument From Induction. Recall that inductive inference involves inferring from premise(s) that a conclusion is probably true. What makes it reasonable for us to accept such inferences? There are only two ways to answer this question. First, we could try to argue that inductive inferences are justified deductively, i.e., are deductively valid. But this is impossible, since inductive inferences are by definition not deductively valid. Second, we could try to appeal to inductive reasoning to answer this question. But this would simply beg the question, since inductive inference is what we are trying to show is reasonable. Thus, there is no way to show that it is reasonable to accept inductive inferences.
But scientific reasoning is ultimately inductive. So, isn't scientific reasoning, and its presuppositions, ultimately arbitrary? If so, why should it be preferred over irrational faith?
We'll start to see the problem with this argument by thinking about how we rely on inductive reasoning. In fact, all of our beliefs about the physical world are the result of inductive reasoning. Your belief that you are reading this paper, for example, is the result of inductive inference. We have just shown that there is no way to prove that it is reasonable to accept inductive inferences. But does it really follow that it is just as reasonable to believe that you are not reading this paper? Or that it is just as reasonable to believe that the Earth is flat rather than spherical? Or to believe that it is just as good to kill people for money as not? Certainly, to conclude that any inductive reasoning is as good as any other is not warranted, even given the Problem of Induction. Some inductive inferences are obviously better than others. In particular, good inductive inferences often allow us to accurately predict the future. For example, your experience with past papers allows you to plausibly infer that this paper is not infinitely long. As you will see in the near future, your conclusion that this paper is not infinitely long is true. This is not only the sort of test of inductive reasoning we use in everyday life, but is also a fundamental test of scientific reasoning. The reason certain scientific theories gain near universal acceptance among experts is their power to repeatedly and accurately predict the future. While this does not avoid the Problem of Induction, it does help us to understand why not every inductive inference is as good as any other. Moreover, it allows us to see why, for all practical purposes, accepting some inductive inferences and rejecting others is not simply a matter of irrational faith.
C. Some Arguments Against Fideism
1. The Moral Problem
Theists hold that religious belief is a reliable guide to morality. They hold that claims such as "Thou shalt not kill," for example, are moral directives that we ought to obey. But then to make religious decisions by means of irrational faith is to make moral decisions by means of irrational faith. One reason this is problematic is that it may support morally repugnant beliefs. What if one accepts on faith that all the infidels should be tortured and executed? or accepts on faith that sexism or racism are good things? or accepts on faith that sex before marriage should be punished by death? Should we accept such views as being sound moral judgments? Clearly not, yet fideism licenses them. Another reason that making moral decisions by means of irrational faith is problematic is that one's decision-making becomes arbitrary. For example, suppose a professor were to assign course grades by rolling a die, and giving anyone who gets a "6" an "A" and everyone else an "F." What would make this so unfair is that such an assignment of grades is arbitrary, i.e., unsupported by good reasons. Similarly, choosing arbitrarily how to morally guide our actions, as required by fideism, will likely result in treating others unfairly.
In short, to accept religious claims irrationally is to accept moral claims irrationally, and this makes irrational religious belief morally irresponsible.
2. Kolak's Objection
This objection to fideism is presented by Daniel Kolak, a contemporary philosopher.  Kolak argues that fideism is incompatible with having a genuine faith.
Suppose that a person, call him Fred, were brainwashed into believing that, say, capitalism is evil. Although Fred believes that capitalism is evil, the belief is not really Fred's own belief, but was forced upon him by those who brainwashed him. Similarly, if Fred had instead been born into an environment where he was always taught that capitalism was evil, and neither he nor anyone else was ever permitted to question this view, one might be inclined to say that this belief was still not really Fred's, but was forced upon him by his environment. By contrast, if Fred were given the option of forming his own view about capitalism, and had entertained reasons for and against the view that capitalism is evil, and decided that the evidence favored the view that capitalism is evil, it would be much more plausible to say that the belief is really Fred's belief. In short, what makes a belief genuinely one's own, rather than something forced on one from the outside, is being able to freely choose which view to accept. Where one is psychologically conditioned to accept a view instead of choosing it, it is not really one's own.
In general, religious beliefs that are held irrationally are the result of psychological conditioning - in particular, emotional attachments inculcated at an early age or during some emotional crisis. In fact, it is this emotional attachment that typically motivates fideism. However, this sort of emotional attachment prevents one from freely choosing whether to accept or reject a religious point of view. But then one's religious beliefs are not really one's own. Thus, fideist faith is not really a genuine faith, because it is not the result of free choice.
 as quoted in Alister E. McGrath, The Christian Theology Reader, Second Ed., (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2001), p. 26.
 United States Catholic Conference - Libreria Editrice Vaticana, Catechism of the Catholic Church, (Liguori, MO: Ligouri, Inc., 1994), p. 40, 43.
 The Holy Bible, King James Version, (Philadelphia, PA: The National Bible Press, 1973). p. 1417.
 Paul Tillich, Dynamics of Faith, (New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1958), p. 1.
 George Seldes, ed., The Great Quotations, (New York, NY: Pocket Books, 1967), p. 340.
 "The Baptist Faith and Message," <http://www.sbc.net/bfm/bfm2000.asp>, accessed September, 2003.
 William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, (New York, NY: Mentor, 1958/1902), p. 197.
 quoted in Thomas V. Morris, Making Sense of it All, (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1992), p. 191.
 Paul Little, Know What and Why You Believe, (Wheaton, IL: Victor Books, 1980), p. 125.
 Karl Barth, Evangelical Theology: An Introduction, (New York, NY: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963), p. 97, 98.
 Believing that something is so can sometimes make it so for some things within one's own mind. For example, believing that you have a belief would obviously make it true that you have a belief. But theists hold not that God is just a belief, but rather that he is a being that would exist even if humans did not.
 For discussion of this distinction, see Daniel Kolak, In Search of God, (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1994), p. 40-44; William Lad Sessions, "The Certainty of Faith", in Faith in Theory and Practice, ed. by Elizabeth S. Radcliffe and Carol J. White, (Chicago, IL: Open Court, 1993), p. 75-89.
 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologia, Volume 1, ed. by Thomas Gilby, (Garden City, NY: Image Books, 1969), p. 66.
 Ed. L. Miller, God and Reason, Second Edition, (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1995), p. 131-132.
 Ed. L. Miller, God and Reason, Second Edition, (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1995), p. 15-16.
 Maurya P. Horgan, "The Letter to the Colossians", The New Jerome Biblical Commentary, ed. by Raymond E. Brown, et al, (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1990), p. 877-878.
 Other examples may include Luke 7:20-23, 1 Kings 18, and the idea that God can be known, even though not directly seen, is suggested by Romans 1:18-20 and Psalms 19:1. For discussion of these, see Louis P. Pojman, "Can Religious Belief Be Rational?", in Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology, Third Edition, ed. by Louis P. Pojman, (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1998), p. 483-492.
 C. S. Lewis, "On Obstinacy In Belief," in Louis Pojman, Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology, Fourth Edition, (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2003), p. 357.
 Rene Descartes, "Meditations on First Philosophy," in John Cottingham, et al, ed.s, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Volume II, (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 39.
 Stephen M. Barr, "Retelling the Story of Science," First Things, March 2003, <http://www.firstthings.com/ftissues/ft0303/articles/barr.html>, accessed December 15, 2003; Paul Little, Know What and Why You Believe, (Wheaton, IL: Victor Books, 1980), p. 212; F. R. Tennant, "Faith," in Terence Penelhum, ed., Faith, (New York, NY: Macmillan, 1989), p. 100.
 Cardinal John Henry Newman, "Sermon 15", Parochial and Plain Sermons, Volume I, originally published in 1834. Available at <http://www.newmanreader.org/works/parochial/volume1/sermon15.html>, accessed October 17, 2003.
 David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, ed. by Tom L. Beauchamp, (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1999/1748), p. 115.
 Daniel Kolak, In Search of God, (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1994), p. 67-69.