THE FORMS OF FOLKLORE: PROSE NARRATIVES

THIS ARTICLE\(^1\) is directed toward a definition of myth, legend, and folktale. These three very basic terms in folklore are loosely used and have sometimes been as hotly disputed as the nature of folklore itself. Definitions and classifications are neither particularly interesting nor necessarily fruitful, but if any field of study needs clarification of its basic terminology it is clearly folklore, which has so long been plagued by inconsistent and contradictory definitions. This article will contribute nothing, however, if it does not lead to some agreement among folklorists on these terms, whatever definitions may ultimately be accepted.

I make no claim to originality in the definitions proposed here. On the contrary, one of the main arguments in support of them is that they conform to what students of the folklore of both nonliterate and European societies have found, as will be shown. I have found them meaningful in some twenty years of teaching and they seem so obvious and self-evident that I can only wonder at the disagreements which have arisen. Less conventional, but certainly not without precedent, is the proposal that these three important forms of folklore be considered as sub-types of a broader form class, the prose narrative. This provides a system of classification in which they constitute a single category, defined in terms of form alone, comparable to the form classes of proverbs, riddles, and other genres of verbal art.\(^2\)

**Prose narrative**, I propose, is an appropriate term for the widespread and important category of verbal art which includes myths, legends, and folktales. These three forms are related to each other in that they are narratives in prose, and this fact distinguishes them from proverbs, riddles, ballads, poems, tongue-twisters, and other forms of verbal art on the basis of strictly formal characteristics. Prose narrative is clearly less equivocal for this broad category than “folktale” because the latter has so often been used by folklorists to mean *Märchen*. Its adoption permits us to equate the English term folktale with the German term *Märchen*, as I do here, and thus to dispense with the latter. Many American folklorists, to be sure, employ the term *Märchen* in English because they use “folktale” to include all of these three sub-types, but this is unnecessary, since prose narrative better serves this purpose. When the term prose narrative proves clumsy or inept, I suggest that *tale* be used as a synonym; this is admittedly more ambiguous, but one can appropriately speak of myths, legends, and folktales as “tales,” and its counterpart in German, *Erzählung*, is similarly used.

I cannot recall how long I have been using the term prose narrative in my folklore course; but when or by whom it was introduced is of less significance than the recent trend towards its acceptance. Boggs used prose narrative to include myth, legend, and “tale” in his article on folklore classification (1949).\(^3\) It has also been used in this sense by Davenport in discussing Marshallese folklore (1953), and by Berry in discussing West African “spoken art” (1961). “Folklore as Prose Narrative” is the title of the second chapter of the Clarkes’ recent book (1963).\(^4\) One may also cite the Herskovits’
Dahomean Narrative (1958), and the founding of the "International Society for Folk Narrative Research" whose first meetings were held in 1962, although neither of these titles differentiate prose narrative from ballads. For a beginning of this trend perhaps one must go back to C. W. von Sydow's "Kategorien der Prosa-Volksdichtung" (1934), or perhaps even to the statement in Frazer's Apollodoros (1921) which is quoted below. If we can adopt prose narrative as the comprehensive term for this major category of folklore, we may proceed to the definition of its main subdivisions.

Folktales are prose narratives which are regarded as fiction. They are not considered as dogma or history, they may or may not have happened, and they are not to be taken seriously. Nevertheless, although it is often said that they are told only for amusement, they have other important functions, as the class of moral folktales should have suggested. Folktales may be set in any time and any place, and in this sense they are almost timeless and placeless. They have been called "nursery tales" but in many societies they are not restricted to children. They have also been known as "fairy tales" but this is inappropriate both because narratives about fairies are usually regarded as true, and because fairies do not appear in most folktales. Fairies, ogres, and even deities may appear, but folktales usually recount the adventures of animal or human characters.

A variety of sub-types of folktales can be distinguished including human tales, animal tales, trickster tales, tall tales, dilemma tales, formulistic tales, and moral tales or fables. It is far more meaningful to group all these fictional narratives under a single heading, the folktale, than to list them side by side with myths and legends as has sometimes been done. Such a list can become almost endless if one adds all distinguishable sub-types, including those which are only of local significance. The definition of the sub-types of the folktale, such as proposed by von Sydow, is an important second step, as is the definition of sub-types of the myth and the legend, but it may be premature before agreement has been reached on the definitions of these three basic categories.

Myths are prose narratives which, in the society in which they are told, are considered to be truthful accounts of what happened in the remote past. They are accepted on faith; they are taught to be believed; and they can be cited as authority in answer to ignorance, doubt, or disbelief. Myths are the embodiment of dogma; they are usually sacred; and they are often associated with theology and ritual. Their main characters are not usually human beings, but they often have human attributes; they are animals, deities, or culture heroes, whose actions are set in an earlier world, when the earth was different from what it is today, or in another world such as the sky or underworld. Myths account for the origin of the world, of mankind, of death, or for characteristics of birds, animals, geographical features, and the phenomena of nature. They may recount the activities of the deities, their love affairs, their family relationships, their friendships and enmities, their victories and defeats. They may purport to "explain" details of ceremonial paraphernalia or ritual, or why taboo must be observed, but such etiological elements are not confined to myths.

Legends are prose narratives which, like myths, are regarded as true by the narrator and his audience, but they are set in a period considered less remote, when the world was much as it is today. Legends are more often secular than sacred, and their principal characters are human. They tell of migrations, wars and victories, deeds of past heroes, chiefs, and kings, and succession in ruling dynasties. In this they are often
the counterpart in verbal tradition of written history, but they also include local tales of buried treasure, ghosts, fairies, and saints.

These distinctions between myth, legend, and folktale may be summarized in the following table. The headings Place, Attitude, and Principal Characters are added in an attempt to indicate subsidiary characteristics; arguments about them are welcome, but they are beside the point of this article. The definition of these three forms is based only on formal features (i.e., prose narratives) and the two headings of Belief and Time.

### Three Forms of Prose Narratives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Form</th>
<th>Belief</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Attitude</th>
<th>Principal Characters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Myth</td>
<td>Fact</td>
<td>Remote past</td>
<td>Different world: other or earlier</td>
<td>Sacred</td>
<td>Non-human</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legend</td>
<td>Fact</td>
<td>Recent past</td>
<td>World of today</td>
<td>Secular or sacred</td>
<td>Human</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Folktale</td>
<td>Fiction</td>
<td>Any time</td>
<td>Any place</td>
<td>Secular</td>
<td>Human or non-human</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Myth, legend, and folktale are not proposed as universally recognized categories, but as analytical concepts which can be meaningfully applied across culturally even when other systems of "native categories" are locally recognized. They derive from the tripartite classification employed by students of European folklore, and presumably reflect the "native categories" of the "folk" of Europe; but they are easily reducible to the dual classification recognized in those societies which, as we shall see, group myths and legends into a single category ("myth-legend"), distinct from folktales which are fictional.

Myth, legend, and folktale are not necessarily the only major categories of prose narratives, under which all other kinds of prose narratives must be classified as subtypes. Reminiscences or anecdotes, humorous or otherwise, and jokes or jests may constitute the fourth and fifth such categories. Reminiscences or anecdotes concern human characters who are known to the narrator or his audience, but apparently they may be retold frequently enough to acquire the style of verbal art and some may be retold after the characters are no longer known at first hand. They are accepted as truth, and can be considered as a sub-type of the legend, or a proto-legend. The Kimbundu and the Marshallese distinguish anecdotes from other legends, as we shall see, but the Hawaiians do not. Anecdotes are not well represented in any of the studies reviewed here. In contrast, jokes or jests do not call for belief on the part of the narrator or his audience, and in this resemble folktales. It may be possible to distinguish jokes from folktales and other prose narratives on formal grounds, but I am not aware that this has been done. In view of the importance of jokes in American folklore, they may seem to deserve a separate category along with myths, legends, and folktales, but this may be an ethnocentric view because little has been written about them outside of literate societies. Both jokes and anecdotes obviously require more attention by folklorists than they have received, but until more is known about them, particularly in nonliterate societies, I prefer to consider them tentatively as sub-types of the folktale and the legend.
In some societies the conventional opening formula which introduces a folktale gives warning to the listener that the narrative which follows is fiction, and that it does not call for belief; and this notice may be repeated in the closing formula. These nominees serve as a frame to enclose folktales, and to set them apart from myths and legends, from normal conversation, and from other forms of serious discourse. This is true of the Ashanti, Yoruba, and Kimbundu of Africa and the Marshallese of the Pacific, among the societies cited here, and apparently of European folklore with its variants on “Once upon a time . . .” and “. . . they lived happily ever after.” In addition, among the Marshall and Trobriand Islanders, and among the Fulani and the Yoruba, factual prose narratives are set aside from fictional ones by tabus against telling folktales in the daytime. As a hypothesis for further investigation one may postulate that if a prose narrative begins with a conventional opening formula (even if its meaning is unknown), and if it should be told only after dark, it is a folktale rather than a myth or a legend.

 Provisionally, at least, one can establish a series of steps to be followed in differentiating myth, legend, and folktale, as outlined in the following table. These steps need not be followed in the sequence indicated, but all of them should be investigated. Reliable conclusions cannot be reached on the basis of any single criterion, such as sacred vs. secular, nor from the contents of the texts alone. For the present, however, the definitions offered here are based only on steps 1, 4, and 5a, all others remaining tentative.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Formal features</th>
<th>PROSE NARRATIVES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>PROSE NARRATIVES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Conventional opening</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Told after dark</td>
<td>No restrictions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Belief</td>
<td>Fact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Setting</td>
<td>Some time and some place</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5a</td>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Remote past</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5b</td>
<td>Place</td>
<td>Earlier or other world</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Attitude</td>
<td>Sacred</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Principal character</td>
<td>Non-human</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Form of prose narrative</td>
<td>Myth</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In these definitions the distinction between fact and fiction refers only to the beliefs of those who tell and hear these tales, and not to our beliefs, to historical or scientific fact, or to any ultimate judgment of truth or falsehood. It may be objected that this is a subjective judgment based on the opinions of informants rather than on objective fact, but it is no more subjective than the distinction between sacred and secular, and in practice it may be even easier to establish. Besides the nominees and tabus mentioned above, some languages have separate terms which distinguish fictional from factual prose narratives. Unfortunately these terms have not been reported as often as could be desired.

Folklorists who are exclusively interested in identifying tale types or in applying the historical-geographical method to the study of a particular tale type may find these distinctions irrelevant, because for distributional and historical studies prose narratives must be considered as a unit. However, for other purposes, including the understanding of the nature of prose narratives and their role in human life, these distinctions are important. As we have seen, myths, legends, and folktales differ in their settings in time and place, in their principal characters and, more importantly, in the beliefs and attitudes associated with them. In addition they often appear in different social settings, being told at different times of day or year, and under quite different circumstances. They may be told for different purposes and have distinctive functions. They may differ in the degree of creative freedom allowed the narrator, in their rates of change, and in the ease with which they spread by diffusion. They may also be distinguished by the presence or absence of conventional opening and closing formulas, stylistic differences, the manner of delivery, the identity of the narrator and the composition of his audience, the degree and nature of audience participation, and the factor of private ownership. The fact that European folklorists from the Grimm Brothers on have been concerned with the distinctions between these three categories is evidence enough that they are not important for the functional-anthropological approach alone.

Consistent with his view of magic, science, and religion, Frazer considered myths to be false science and legends to be false history. The attempt to distinguish beliefs which are scientifically true or false is of course valid and important for certain purposes; but when this distinction is made a criterion for the definition of myth or of legend, it only adds to the confusion. None of these three forms of prose narrative need be true, and least of all the folktale.

Moreover, it gives to myth a significance approaching the objectionable popular usage, as in "That's only a myth" or "That's just folklore," meaning simply something which is not true. An extreme expression of this view is to be seen in the proceedings of the Fourteenth Conference of the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute for Social Research, entitled Myth in Modern Africa (1960), where myth is equated with unverifiable belief. In the usage of folklorists for over a century, myths are not simply beliefs: they are prose narratives.

In passing from one society to another through diffusion, a myth or legend may be accepted without being believed, thus becoming a folktale in the borrowing society; and the reverse may also happen. It is entirely possible that the same tale type may be a folktale in one society, a legend in a second society, and a myth in a third. Furthermore, in the course of time fewer and fewer members of a society may believe in a myth, and especially in a period of rapid cultural change an entire belief system and
its mythology can be discredited. Even in cultural isolation, there may be some skeptics who do not accept the traditional system of belief.

Nevertheless it is important to know what the majority in a society believes to be true at a given point in time, for people act upon what they believe to be true. It is also worth knowing that certain narratives were formerly believed as myth or legend, and which tales are losing (or gaining) credence. Moreover, in many societies distinctions are made between prose narratives on the basis of whether they are considered fact or fiction.

Because a particular plot or tale type would be classed as a myth in one society and as a folktale in another, Boas said “it is impossible to draw a sharp line between myths and folk tales.” This well known but sometimes misunderstood statement, quoted out of context, may have deterred attempts to define these terms. Yet if one reads the relevant passages with care, it is apparent that Boas was not expressing the belief that distinctions between myths and folktales are impossible, but rather he was objecting to attempts to classify a particular tale type as myth or as folktale. He was also objecting to attempts to define myth in terms of explanatory elements, supernatural phenomena, or the personification of animals, plants, and natural phenomena, because these may also occur in other kinds of prose narratives. I accept and endorse all of these objections.

Admittedly in an earlier statement Boas said that the strict adherence to one of these principles of classification would “result in the separation of tales that are genetically connected, one being classed as myths, the other with folk-tales. It goes without saying that in this way unnecessary difficulties are created.” These difficulties of course do not arise so long as one considers myths and folktales together under the rubric of prose narratives or “tales,” as Boas presumably recognized subsequently, since this objection is omitted in his restatement in 1938. Moreover, in his earlier statement he proceeded immediately to suggest definitions which lead to the separation of genetically related tales. He proposed adherence to

the definition of myth given by the Indian himself. In the mind of the American native there exists almost always a clear distinction between two classes of tales. One group relates incidents which happened at a time when the world had not yet assumed its present form, when mankind was not yet in possession of all the arts and customs that belong to our period. The other group contains tales of our modern period. In other words, tales of the first group are considered as myths; those of the other, as history.

This distinction conforms closely to that made here between myth and legend. Boas refers to “folktales that are purely imaginative” and says that “folktales must be considered as analogous to modern novelistic literature.” This suggests that the American Indians have fictional narratives, but from his discussion it is not clear whether they differentiate between true and fictional tales. However, this distinction can be justified on grounds similar to that offered by Boas for distinguishing myths from legends: that it is clearly recognized in the minds of many peoples in many parts of the world.

On the Trobriand Islands myths, legends, and folktales are clearly distinguished in terms comparable to the definitions proposed here; Malinowski’s well known statements may be summarized as follows:
1. *Kukwanebu* are “fairy tales” (i.e., folktales) which are fictional, privately owned, and dramatically told. They are told after dark in November, between the planting and fishing seasons. They end with a formalized reference to a very fertile wild plant and there is a vague belief, not very seriously held, that their recital has a beneficial influence on the new crops. Their main function is amusement.

2. *Libuqwugo* are legends which are serious statements of knowledge. They are believed to be true and to contain important factual information. They are not privately owned, are not told in any stereotyped way, and are not magical in their effect. Their main function is to provide information, and they are told at any time of day and year whenever someone makes specific inquiries about facts, but they are often told during the season of trading voyages.

3. *Liliu* are myths which are regarded not merely as true, but as venerable and sacred. They are told during the preparation for rituals, which are performed at different times throughout the year. Their main function is to serve as a justification of the rituals with which they are associated.\(^\text{12}\)

Similarly in North America, the Mandan, Hidatsa, and Arikara “recognize three classes of storytelling which approximate very nearly to the myth, legend, and tale [i.e., folktale] of Malinowski.”\(^\text{13}\) Despite the difficulty of classifying certain tales, these categories have also been successfully applied to Eskimo folklore. According to Essene

*Myths* are often classified as those stories with a high emotional content, and particularly those having to do with religion. Myths often must be recited in a letter perfect fashion. In the previous selection, Lantis cites the essentially religious myths about Moon-Man and the Old Lady of the Sea. An Eskimo considers these stories to be the absolute truth. No explanation of Eskimo religion is complete without including such myths as these, which are accepted on faith.

*Tales* or folklore [i.e., folktales], while often containing elements of the supernatural, are generally recognized by the listeners as fiction. Normally, the story teller is allowed to vary a tale within certain limits. It is with tales that the narrator has the most opportunity to display his virtuosity as a story teller.

A third type of story, the *legend*, tells the purported history of a people. Though seldom even approximately accurate, it is usually believed to be completely true. Even skilled ethnographers are often fooled by the plausibility of legends, the more so if they hear the account from a skillful narrator. Careful analysis of a legend, however, usually shows a minute amount of truth mixed with many halftruths and many more pure inventions.

In most cultures of the world a fairly clear separation of myths, tales, and legends is possible. Difficulties arise when one story partakes of the characteristics of two or even three of these types. Also the same story may be told in sacred as well as in profane settings. Eskimo stories are at times difficult to classify, but so far as possible the terms will be used here as defined above...”\(^\text{14}\)

Citing Essene’s statements, Lantis comments

In Nunivak literature, the Raven and other animal anecdotes would be considered tales [i.e., folktales] by almost anyone. They may be improbable but are not mystical. To the listener, the characteristics and intentions of the animal characters are obvious, taken for granted, and he can have fun in identifying with them or in divorcing himself from them, laughing at the other fellow who is stupid. He has fun in the open disregard of mores and sanctions. There is pleasure in avowed exercise of imagination and ingenuity.

Nunivak war stories have no supernaturalism and are clearly legends. There is
apparently no symbolism; traits of individuals and villages are portrayed directly. Again there is open identification with the war heroes and rejection of the enemy and the losers. There is, however, another element: horror instead of fun. The narrator says in effect, "We, Nunivakers, have suffered at the hands of these people." The emotional appeal is great, but again not mystical.

Most of the stories can be classified as myths. They deal with the supernatural, the mysterious. There seem to be two principal moods: yearning, wishing; and uneasiness, fear. Here is the best place to look for the subconscious. Myths utilize religious concepts and beliefs even when they are not "religious." Probably Essene's statement should be modified slightly: Myths may have no greater emotional appeal than war legends, but they tap different emotions and in a different way.15

These two statements have been quoted at length because they show how, even though some Eskimo stories are difficult to classify, these three categories can nevertheless be meaningfully applied. It is clear that the Eskimo have myths which are accepted on faith as the absolute truth, and legends which tell "purported history" which is "usually believed to be completely true." It is not clear whether the Eskimo themselves differentiate myths from legends, but they obviously distinguish both from folktales, which are recognized as fiction.

Similarly the Subiya and Lozi of Africa may, or may not, differentiate myths from legends, but they do distinguish both from fictional narratives. Jacottet divides their tales into contes (folktales) and légendes, including légendes religieuses or myths about God and the origin of man. The myths and legends relate events in which the people believe, or at least recently believed; in the mind of the narrator they actually happened in the distant past. On the contrary, in the spirit in which it is told, the conte or folktale is a purely imaginary tale.16

However, only two kinds of prose narratives, true and fictional, are distinguished in a number of other societies. Here again folktales are clearly recognized as fiction, but myth and legend apparently blend into a single category, "myth-legend." This is true for the Ponapeans and Hawaiians of the Pacific, the Dakota and Kiowa of North America, and the West African Fulani (Fulakunda), Efik, Yoruba, Ibo, and Fon (Dahomeans). It may also be true of the Eskimo, the Subiya, Lozi, Kimbundu, and Ashanti of Africa, and the Ifugao of the Philippines.

Thus Ponapeans distinguish their fictional narratives from myth-legends (papath) which deal with the creation of their island and its settlement, the totemic origins of their clans, the introduction of plant crops and useful arts, the magical erection of the impressive stone ruins at Nāniwe, and how a single king once ruled the entire island. The Ponapean myth-legend is secret and privately owned by specialists (śōopath), and taught to a son by his father in the privacy of the bedroom after the family was retired.

Hawaiians use the term kaao for a fictional story or one in which fancy plays an important part, that of moolelo for a narrative about a historical figure, one which is supposed to follow historical events. Stories of the gods are moolelo. They are distinguished from secular narrative not by name, but by manner of telling. Sacred stories are told only by day and the listeners must not move in front of the speaker; to do so would be highly disrespectful to the gods. Folktales [i.e., legend] in the form of anecdote, local legend, or family story is also classed under moolelo.17
In North America the Dakota "distinguish two classes of tales—the 'true' and the 'lying'. . . Other Indian tribes make somewhat similar distinctions." Kiowa myth-legends or "true stories" include tales of the origin of the Pleiades, of Buffalo Old Woman, of Red Horse or Cyclone, and of rituals as well as "pseudo-historical stories" of hunting, raiding, fighting, and affiliations with other tribes. The Kiowa tale of Split Boys "is undoubtedly a myth or ritual tale, a 'true story' as the Kiowa put it, in distinction to the pulhoeitekya, lie or joke story." The Fulani also distinguish two categories of prose narratives, the myth-legend (tindol, pl. tindi) and the folklore tale (talalol, pl. tali).

The tindi, which correspond a little to our legends, are considered by the Fulakunda as accounts of adventures having taken place in antiquity. They require a greater portion of truth than the talii, concerning which one never knows if they are not only fiction. Tali and deddi [riddles] are told at night. To do so in broad daylight is to risk the loss of a close relative: father, mother, brother or sister. The tindi can be told regardless of the hour.

The Efik possess a folklore classification of their own. Myths, legends and stories are classified as mbuk. . . . The term ñke comprises the folklore, proverb, pun, tongue twister, riddle and tone riddle. The term ata ñke "real ñke" distinguishes the folklore from other forms of ñke. . . . Myths, legends and stories are believed historically true, and dealt with such incidents as the early history of the Efik, how Efik obtained the Leopard Society, revenge of supernatural powers on mortals, effects of magic medicine and witchcraft, and exploits of famous war chieftains.

The Yoruba recognize two classes of tales: folktales (alo) and myth-legends (itan). Myth-legends are spoken of as "histories" and are regarded as historically true; they are quoted by the elders in serious discussions of ritual or political matters, whenever they can assist in settling a point of disagreement. Unlike myth-legends, folktales must not be told during the daytime, lest the narrator lose his way, and they have conventional opening and closing formulas. According to an Ibo student in the United States, the Ibo similarly distinguish folktales (iro) from myth-legends (ita).

The Fon of Dahomey recognize the same two categories. The myth-legends (hwenooho), which include tales of the deities and the peopling of the earth, accounts of wars, and exploits of the ruling dynasty, are regarded as true. The folktales (heho) "tell of things which never existed and are inventions of people." "What is important is that the Dahomean names his abstractions, that he has words to define the categories he distinguishes. In his classification of narrative, he identifies two broad categories, the hwenooho, literally 'time-old-story,' which he translates variously as history, as tradition, as traditional history, or as ancient lore; and the heho, the tale [i.e., folklore]. It is a distinction that the youngest story-teller recognizes.

The Herskovitses, like Essene and others, have commented on the difficulty of applying these categories to specific tales: "Narratives overlap even in the two major divisions, and Dahomeans are hard put to it to give a categorical answer if asked to designate the type to which certain tales belong. This applies especially where the heho is of the type we would describe as a fable, or as a parable. Indeed a parable has been named by one informant as falling into the proverb group." Nevertheless
factual and fictional narratives are clearly recognized as separate categories in many societies and, as they note, the distinction between them is recognized by even the youngest Dahomean story-teller.

Speaking more generally of West Africa, Berry says:

Prose narratives are part of the cultural tradition of all West African peoples. A first and generally valid dichotomy would appear to be between fictional and non-fictional narrative. Under the latter heading I would subsume what have been variously considered as myths, legends, and chronicles. These are distinguished from tales proper, that is from fictional narrative, by the fact that they are regarded in context as true. Ethnographically at least, they are history. Myths, chiefly stories of the deities and origins of natural phenomena, are especially important throughout West Africa and a large body of mythology has been recorded. Legends which recount the origins of families or clans and explain the ritual and taboos of the ancestral code, are less well documented. Understandably so: They are told only for instruction within the group, and rarely to outsiders. . . . Fictional material includes in the main serious explanatory and moralizing tales, humorous trickster tales, and tales developed wholly or essentially in human society.25

A different picture is presented in the Marshall Islands of Micronesia, where Davenport reports that five kinds of “prose narratives” are recognized. Upon examination, three of these appear to be categories of the myth-legend, although Marshallese beliefs are in the process of change; none are introduced with the nominee which is used for fiction. Davenport’s “myths” (bwebwenato) are clearly myth-legends. They “include such subjects as traditional history, genealogies, and explanatory tales of several kinds. . . . The myths are generally accepted as true, though today parts, particularly those which tell of the old gods and demigods, may not be so regarded.” The “Edao stories” (bwebwenato Edao) are a cycle of humorous myth-legends about Edao, the local equivalent of Maui and other tricksters. “Even though they regard his doings as impossible, the people believe a man named Edao once lived in the islands. . . . This element of belief in the stories as well as in their content relates them to some of the modern myths.” The “modern myths” (bwebwenato i mol) are humorous anecdotes about well-known persons. “These are the ‘true’ stories of today. Because their veracity is undisputed, they are very hard to get at, for the people do not class them with other forms of stories.”

The “half fairy tale, half myth” (inon-bwebwenato) is a folktale (inon) which was formerly a myth-legend (bwebwenato). In the course of cultural change these narratives have become folktales; they are no longer generally believed, and they may be introduced by the nominee which indicates they are fiction. “This category, the least well defined of all, comprises the tales which are told as fairy tales, but which some people either still believe parts of or retain a reverence for, and so are unwilling to say that they are the same as other fairy tales [i.e., folktales]. Just which stories would be classified under this heading would vary considerably from village to village and island to island.” The “fairy tale” (inon) is the folktale, and is clearly regarded as fiction. It “always begins with the word kiniwatne, which without specific meaning signifies ‘this is a fairy tale; it may or may not have happened long ago; it is not to be taken seriously; it is not always supposed to be logical.’ In ordinary discourse, a person exaggerating or telling an unbelievable story is accused of telling fairy tales.” Folktales must not be told during the day lest the heads of the narrator and his listeners swell up as “big as a house.”26
The distinction between true and fictional narratives is also made by the Ifugao of the Philippines and by the Kimbundu and Ashanti of Africa, but the data do not indicate whether or not myths and legends are distinguished. Thus it is not certain whether the Ifugao have legends or whether the Kimbundu have myths, or whether what Rattray calls “historical myths” are myths or legends. Here again all “true” tales may be myth-legends.

This distinction between myth and folktale is always clear in the mind of the Ifugao. Myths—I think all of them—are used ritually; they enter into the framework and constitution of the culture and its world viewpoint; they are taken seriously, they are never, as myths, related for diversion. I have found only two myths that have folktale versions. In these instances the folktale versions are not taken seriously—the true version is believed to be the mythical one. . . . I hesitate to say that there exists in the mind of the Ifugao the distinction that Boas asserts always to exist in the mind of the American Indian, namely that the myth “relates incidents which happened at a time when the world had not yet assumed its present form and when mankind was not yet in possession of all the arts and customs that belong to our period. The other group (folktales) [i.e., legends] contains tales of our modern period.” It will hereafter be seen that the Ifugao, on account of the manner in which he uses myths in ritual, is continually switching from present to past, and sometimes he muddles the two. . . . I define myths by the criteria of credence and function. A myth is a narrative that is believed, at least by the unsophisticated, and which enters into and bolsters the framework of the culture and its concept of the world. . . . Myths enter into nearly every Ifugao ritual, even into those of decidedly minor importance. The myth itself is called uwa or abuwab (in Kankanai susuwa); its recitation is called bukad.57

The Kimbundu of Angola also distinguish true and fictional tales, but Chatelain’s evidence suggests that they have no myths. This would be a remarkable fact, if true, and it would make Kimbundu categories far less applicable to African folklore than he believed. According to Chatelain the Kimbundu distinguish three categories of prose narratives: folktale and two types of legends. One class of legends (maka) is that of “true stories, or rather stories reputed true; what we call anecdotes.” They are entertaining, but they are intended to be instructive. “The didactic tendency of these stories is in no way technical, but essentially social. They do not teach how to make a thing, but how to act, how to live.” The second class of legends (ma-lunda or mi-sendu) are historical narratives. “They are the chronicles of the tribe and nation, carefully preserved and transmitted by the head men or elders of each political unit, whose origin, constitution, and vicissitudes they relate. The ma-lunda are generally considered state secrets, and the plebeians get only a few scraps from the sacred treasure of the ruling class.” In contrast, folktale (mi-soso) include “all traditional fictitious stories, or rather, those which strike the native mind as being fictitious. . . . Their object is less to instruct than to entertain. . . . They are always introduced and concluded with a special formula.”58

Writing of the Ashanti of Ghana, Rattray says:

Each and all of the stories in this volume would, however, be classed by the Akan-speaking African under the generic title of “Ananiesem” (Spider stories), whether the spider appeared in the tale or not. There is a clear distinction in the mind of the West African between all such tales, ostensibly told in public for amusement, and those other
records which the European also classes as Folk-lore, but which are regarded by the African as falling into a totally different category. I refer to the historical myths [i.e., myths, legends, or myth-legends], which—unlike these Märchen—are the sacred and guarded possession of a few selected elders or a tribe. Such historical myths are, indeed, the “Old Testament” of the African.

Before beginning a folktale the Ashanti raconteur stated “that what he was about to say was just make-believe” through the opening formula “We do not really mean, we do not really mean, (that what we are going to say is true);” and he concluded, in one of their conventional closing formulas, “This, my story, which I have related; if it be sweet, (or) if it not be sweet; some you may take as true, and the rest you may praise me (for the telling of it).”

Where these categories are most difficult to apply is in those cases where the investigator has failed to consider, or at least to discuss, the question of belief; yet the answer to this question is important, regardless of what definitions are accepted. Radin has pointed out that the Winnebago have two stylistically distinct kinds of prose narratives. “In the first, the waika, the actors are always of divine origin, the action always takes place in a long past mystical era and the end is always happy. In the other, the worak, the actors are human, the action takes place within the memory of man and the end is uniformly tragic.” One is tempted to consider the former as myths and the latter as legends, and to ask if the Winnebago lacked folktales. Yet earlier Radin says that waika “includes all we would term myths and maerchen,” while worak “includes some narratives that we would include among the myths and maerchen. The majority, however, we would definitely exclude from that category.” Without knowing which, if any, tales are regarded as fiction we are left in doubt as to what waika and worak are, in what category the majority of worak do belong, and what Radin means by Märchen.

Lowie says

It is not at all easy to classify Crow tales. There are true myths like the stories about Old Man Coyote and Old Woman’s Grandchild,—stories that explicitly deal with a condition of life different from that of recent times and accounting for the origin of a natural phenomenon or of some established usage. But the line between these and more matter of fact tales cannot be sharply drawn, for marvelous happenings belonged to the routine of life until a few decades ago, as shown by reports of visions experienced by men I personally knew. Also the origin of certain institutions may crop up in relatively matter of fact settings. Nor do the Indians ascribe greater value either to the plainly mythical or the obviously non-mythical category.

This last sentence refers to tale preferences, and not to sanctity or belief, and again Lowie leaves us in doubt as to the existence of fictional narratives; the balance of this statement is a reiteration of Boas’ position. In a posthumous article Lowie says of Crow prose narratives “myths and folktales—not always distinguishable—are forms of fiction. One must also include tales of personal adventure, topical stories, and historical narratives, for all three admit of distinctly literary effects.” Here he is obviously using fiction as an objective concept, leaving unanswered the question of whether myths and folktales were believed to be true. “Inevitably the several literary categories differ in their style, some conforming more closely than others to the colloquial forms. Even myths do not use identical formal patterns. Trickster stories
generally begin with a set statement: ‘It was Old Man Coyote. He was going around, he was hungry.’ Nothing comparable occurs in hero tales.”²² Crow trickster tales, it would seem, are different from both myths and hero tales (legends); they are clearly not another type of legend; and they begin with somewhat conventionalized formula. But were they considered fictional or factual?

Such examples are too numerous to list, but Benedict’s statement has been quoted so often that it calls for comment. “In Zuni, tales fall into no clearly distinguishable categories. The divisions I have used in this volume are for convenience of reference only, and have little to do with the literary problems of the narrator.”³³ Considering her title, Zuni Mythology, one can only speculate whether she simply did not consider legends and folktales, or whether the Zuni have no “native categories” for their prose narratives. Even if the latter is correct, this is not to say that the three analytical concepts as defined here would not be useful if we had information on the question of belief, and on the other characteristics mentioned above. Perhaps their applicability would become apparent if Zuni tales were examined with the same care and detail as those of the Wind River Shoshoni.

The Wind River Shoshoni have a single term for all prose narratives (nareguyap) and do not distinguish between them linguistically, either on the basis of fact and fiction or of “the mythic primeval era and the historical present.” Nevertheless they have myths, legends, and “fairy tales,” and the latter are recognized as fiction, as Hultkrantz has recently shown in his penetrating analysis of their religious prose narratives.³⁴ Moreover, Hultkrantz’s definitions of these forms parallel those offered here:

The myth, as I understand it, is a narrative of gods and divine beings, whose actions take place in the period when the present world was formed (in principle, their actions are not bound by time). The myth is often sacred in itself, and it is always an object of belief. The legend deals with human beings, preferably heroes, and their supernatural experiences, and is regarded as a true description. The fairy tale (Märchen), again, makes use of the milieu and the personages of the myth and the legend, but without the dramatic action in which these are involved being considered true. There are, naturally, also profane Märchen, but these are without relevance in the present connection.

Despite the incompleteness of the evidence, and despite these variations in native categories, the definitions of myth, legend, and folktale offered here are analytically useful. They can be meaningfully applied even to societies in which somewhat different distinctions between prose narratives are recognized. They make it possible to say that the Trobriand Islanders and others distinguish myths, legends, and folktales as defined here; whereas the Wind River Shoshoni group theirs together in a single category; and the Yoruba and others class myths and legends in a single category which is distinguished from folktales. For certain analytic and comparative purposes, moreover, it is necessary to distinguish the different kinds of Shoshoni tales, and to distinguish Yoruba myths from their legends, even though the Shoshoni and the Yoruba do not do so themselves.

These categories also make it possible to say that although the Hawaiians have only two terms for prose narratives, one for folktales and one for myth-legends, their myths can be distinguished from their legends by the circumstances in which they are told. We can also say that in addition to the myth-legend and the folktale, the
Marshall Islanders have separate categories for folktales which once were myth-legend, for a cycle of trickster myth-legends, and for humorous anecdotes; and that the Kimbundu similarly distinguish anecdotes from other legends. If true, it is also meaningful to say that the Kimbundu have no myths; and that the Ojibwa—to my knowledge the only society reported to lack fictional prose narratives—apparently have no folktales.\footnote{85}

If these definitions are analytically useful for the study of prose narratives in nonliterate societies, they can also be applied meaningfully to Euro-American folklore. In the United States, myths may be lacking, but folktales and legends are clearly distinguished. Halpert says, "I have known women story tellers who call tall stories 'damn lies' which they scorned to repeat; but they have no hesitation in telling me legends which they believed were 'true'. "\footnote{86}

In fact, these categories of prose narratives are derived from the study of European folklore, and they have long been distinguished in similar terms by its students. Although both terminology and definitions have varied, the concepts of myths, legends, and folktales in English are comparable to \textit{Mythen}, \textit{Sagen}, and \textit{Märchen} in German, and to \textit{mythes}, \textit{traditions populaires}, and \textit{contes populaires} in French.

Janet Bacon in 1925 distinguished between myths, legends, and folktales, saying that "Myth has an explanatory function. It explains some natural phenomenon whose causes are not obvious, or some ritual practise whose origin has been forgotten. . . . Legend, on the other hand, is true tradition founded on fortunes of real people or on adventures at real places. . . . Folk tale, however, calls for no belief, being wholly the product of imagination."\footnote{87}

Her distinctions were adapted from the definitions proposed in 1921 by no less eminent a folklorist than Sir James Frazer, who wrote

As the distinction between myth, legend, and folk-tale is not always clearly apprehended or uniformly observed, it may be well to define the sense in which I employ these terms.

By myths I understand mistaken explanations of phenomena, whether of human life or of external nature. Such explanations originate in that instinctive curiosity concerning the causes of things which at a more advanced stage of knowledge seeks satisfaction in philosophy and science, but being founded on ignorance and misapprehension they are always false, for were they true they would cease to be myths. The subjects of myths are as numerous as the objects which present themselves to the mind of man; for everything excites his curiosity, and of everything he desires to learn the cause. Among the larger questions which many peoples have attempted to answer by myths are those which concern the origin of the world and of man, the apparent motions of the heavenly bodies, the regular recurrence of the seasons, the growth and decay of vegetation, the fall of rain, the phenomena of thunder and lightning, of eclipses and earthquakes, the discovery of fire, the invention of the useful arts, the beginnings of society, and the mystery of death. In short, the range of myths is as wide as the world, being coextensive with the curiosity and the ignorance of man.

By legends I understand traditions, whether oral or written, which relate the fortunes of real people in the past, or which describe events, not necessarily human, that are said to have occurred at real places. Such legends contain a mixture of truth and falsehood, for were they wholly true, they would not be legends but histories. The proportion of truth and falsehood naturally varies in different legends; generally, perhaps, falsehood predominates, at least in the details, and the element of the marvellous or the miraculous often, though not always, enters largely into them.
By folk-tales I understand narratives invented by persons unknown and handed down at first by word of mouth from generation to generation, narratives which, though they profess to describe actual occurrences, are in fact purely imaginary, having no other aim than the entertainment of the hearer and making no claim on his credulity. In short, they are fictions pure and simple, devised not to instruct or edify the listener, but only to amuse him; they belong to the region of pure romance.

If these definitions be accepted, we may say that myth has its source in reason, legend in memory, and folk-tale in imagination; and that the three riper products of the human mind which correspond to these its crude creations are science, history, and romance.

But while educated and reflective men can clearly distinguish between myths, legends, and folk-tales, it would be a mistake to suppose that the people among whom these various narratives commonly circulate, and whose intellectual cravings they satisfy, can always or habitually discriminate between them. For the most part, perhaps, the three sorts of narrative are accepted by the folk as all equally true or at least equally probable.

Although Jane Harrison's definition of myth as the spoken correlate of ritual acts differs from that which is presented here, and indeed includes forms of verbal art which are not (or are not yet) narratives, she regarded myths as very different from legends and folktales. "It is this collective sanction and solemn purpose that differentiate the myth alike from the historical narrative [i.e., legend] and the mere conte or fairy-tale [i.e., folktale]."

In 1908 Gomme had offered his definitions of these three terms:

The first necessity is for definitions. Careful attention to what has already been said will reveal the fact that tradition contains three separate classes, and I would suggest definition of these classes by a precise application of terms already in use: The myth belongs to the most primitive stages of human thought, and is the recognisable explanation of some natural phenomenon, some forgotten or unknown object of human origin, or some event of lasting influence; the folk-tale is a survival preserved amidst culture-surroundings of a more advanced age, and deals with events and ideas of primitive times in terms of the experience or of episodes in the lives of unnamed human beings; the legend belongs to an historical personage, locality, or event. These are new definitions, and are suggested in order to give some sort of exactness to the terms in use. All these terms—myth, folk-tale, and legend—are now used indiscriminately with no particular definiteness. The possession of three such distinct terms forms an asset which should be put to its full use, and this cannot be done until we agree upon a definite meaning for each.

As a cultural evolutionist Gomme viewed folktales as derived from myths, but he recognized that the folktale is neither sacred nor believed:

It has become the fairy tale or the nursery tale. It is told to grown-up people, not as belief but as what was once believed; it is told to children, not to men; to lovers of romance, not to worshippers of the unknown; it is told by mothers and nurses, not by philosophers or priestesses; in the gathering ground of home life, or in the nursery, not in the hushed sanctity of a great wonder.

Still earlier, in 1904, Bethe gave a series of lectures, later published as Märchen, Sage, Mythus, in which he argued that these three forms were subtypes of the "tale" (Erzählung):

Mythus, Sage, Märchen are academic concepts. Really all three mean the same, nothing more than Erzählung, the Greek word as well as the two German words. The word 'Märchen' came to have its present current meaning at the end of the eighteenth century,
as the Oriental Märchen became known. But it was only about a century ago that these three concepts were established and the words were forced into these meanings, with the result that 'Mythus' means tales of the gods (Göttersagen), 'Sage' narratives attached to particular persons, certain localities or customs, and 'Märchen' the abundant unattached stories.\[42\\]

Later in this work, Bethe offers his own distinctions between these three concepts.

Mythus, Sage, and Märchen differ from one another in origin and purpose. Mythus is primitive philosophy, the simplest intuitive form of thought, a series of attempts to understand the world, to explain life and death, fate and nature, gods and cults. Sage is primitive history, naively fashioned in hate and love, unconsciously transformed and simplified. But Märchen arose from the need for entertainment and serves only this purpose. Therefore it is free of time and place; therefore it takes what seems entertaining and omits what is boring, here in one way there in another, each time according to the narrator's taste. It is nothing but poetry, the quintessence of all works of fantasy of mankind.\[43\\]

It is apparent that students of European folklore have long recognized both the significance of distinctions between myth, legend, and folktale and the fact that all three are different forms of "Erzählung" or "tradition" or "narrative." Usage has varied, but there is considerable agreement that myths include tales of deities and creation; legends deal with human characters who are considered historical persons; and while both myths and legends are believed, folktales are distinguished from them in that they are accepted as fiction.

Finally, if we go back to what are generally acknowledged as the very beginnings of the modern study of folklore, we find that the Grimm brothers made similar distinctions between Märchen, Sagen, and Mythen, devoting a separate major work to each. In Deutsche Mythologie, Jacob Grimm says:

The folktale (märchen) is with good reason distinguished from the legend, though by turns they play into one another. Looser, less fettered than legend, the folktale lacks that local habitation which hampers legend, but makes it more home-like. The folktale flies, the legend walks, knocks at your door; the one can draw freely out of the fulness of poetry, the other has almost the authority of history. As the folktale stands related to legend, so does legend to history, and (we may add) so does history to real life. In real existence all the outlines are sharp, clear and certain, which on history's canvas are gradually shaded off and toned down. The ancient myth, however, combines to some extent the qualities of folktale and legend; untrammeled in its flight, it can yet settle down in a local home. . . . In the folktale also, dwarfs and giants play their part. . . . Folktales, not legends, have in common with the god-myth (göttermyth) a multitude of metamorphoses; and they often let animals come upon the stage, and so they trespass on the old animal-epos. . . . Divinities form the core of all mythology.\[44\\]

These are by no means precise definitions, but Deutsche Mythologie (1835) is clearly concerned with myths, Deutsche Sagen (1816-1818) is a collection of legends, and Kinder- und Hausmärchen (1812-1815) is a collection of folktales. One needs only to examine the contents of these three works to see how closely the three categories distinguished by the Grimm brothers correspond to the definitions offered here.
What is surprising, in view of this, is the seeming conspiracy of later folklorists to corrupt the meanings of folklore, legend, and myth—which the Grimm so clearly distinguished—with new definitions, new distinctions, and new usages. If it is now time to return to Thom's original definition of folklore to reach some basis of agreement between humanists and social scientists, it is also time to return to the categories recognized by the Grimm Brothers in order to reach some basis of understanding in folklore. It is time to agree upon English equivalents of Mythen, Sagen, and Märchen, and to agree upon their definitions.

As I stated at the outset, this article will contribute nothing if it does not lead to some agreement among folklorists on the usage of the terms myth, legend, and folklore. It is probably too much to hope that any system of classification or any set of definitions will be followed by the commercial entrepreneurs in folklore or by the many varieties of amateurs, but at least professional folklorists from both the humanities and the social sciences should be able to reach some agreement.

NOTES

1. Part of this article was presented at the meetings of the American Folklore Society in Detroit in December, 1963; the balance was read at the International Congress of Americanists in Barcelona in August, 1964. It has benefited from discussions at these meetings, as well as from comments by Archer Taylor, Alan Dundes, John Greenway, and others who read the original draft. I wish also to thank the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research for making it possible for me to attend the meetings in Spain.

2. For a similar attempt to define riddles, see Robert A. Georges and Alan A. Dundes, "Toward a Structural Definition of the Riddle," Journal of American Folklore, LXXVI (1963), 111-8.


5. Reprinted in C. W. v. Sydow, Selected Papers on Folklore (Copenhagen, 1948), 60-88, with the title translated as "The Categories of Prose Tradition."

6. C. W. v. Sydow, 60-88. A consideration of various definitions of the sub-types of folktales, myths, and legends is beyond the scope of this paper, but I fail to see that von Sydow has demonstrated his claim that both steps must be made simultaneously, or his assertion that the distinction made between folktales and legends (Märchen and Sage) by the Grimms is scientifically unsatisfactory.

7. African accounts of lineage origins, which are both highly esoteric and sacred, are in my opinion legends. Similarly, European saints' legends may also be sacred.

8. I am indebted to my colleague, Alan Dundes, for suggesting that the procedural steps be spelled out in this second table, and for other suggestions.


17. Martha Beckwith, Hawaiian Mythology (New Haven, 1940), 1.

Elise Clews Parsons, *Kiowa Tales (Memoirs of the American Folklore Society, XXII, 1929), xvii-xviii.*

Monique de Lestrangé, *Contes et légendes des Fulakunda du Badyar (Études Guineennes, No. 7, 1951), 6-7.*

D. C. Simmons, "Specimens of Efik Folklore," *Folklore, LXVI (1955), 417-8.*


Herskovits and Herskovits, 16.


"The northern Ojibwa, for example, have no category of fiction at all; both their sacred stories and their tales are thought to be true. Consequently there is no art of imaginative fiction in this society, and no incentive to its creation." A. I. Hallowell, "Myth, Culture and Personality," *American Anthropologist, XLIX* (1947), 547.


George Laurence Gomme, *Folklore as an Historical Science* (London, 1908), 129.

Gomme, 1908, 149.


Bethe, 117.

Except for substituting "folktale" for "fairy-tale" and "myth" for "mythus," the translation here follows Stallybrass. See Jacob Grimm, *Teutonic Mythology.* Translated from the fourth edition with notes and appendix by James Steven Stallybrass (London, 1882-83), III, xvi-xvii. In the original *Mythen* and *Mythus* are less often employed than *Mythologie* because Grimm was attempting to reconstruct the mythology from fragmentary remains of myths.

University of California
Berkeley, California