X. Knowledge Organization
A. Tulving's Systems: Procedural,
Episodic,
& Semantic Memory
B. The 'Basic'
Unit
Of Organization
1.
Categories
a.
Hierarchical Network Model (Collins & Quillian): Categories
Linked
in a Network
i. The Network: Labeled Nodes & Labeled (Category &
Property) Links
ii. Organization: The Cognitive Economy Principle
iii. Major Predictions: Category Size Effect & Property
Verification Effect
b. Feature Comparison Model (Rips, Shoben, & Smith):
Categories
as Weighted Feature Lists
i. Weighting Features
ii. Distinguishing Defining from Characteristic Features
iii. Two Stages of Processing: Overall Similarity
(Familiarity)
& Careful Search
iv. Major Predictions
a) positive (typicality) & negative relatedness effects
b) why category size effects occur & what they really are
c) obtaining a reverse category size effect
c.
Spreading Activation Model (Collins & Loftus)
i. Three New Structual Assumptions
ii. Two New Processing Assumptions
iii. Evidence for Spreading Activation
iv. The Model as a Framework
v. Smith on Feature List Theories versus Networks
2.
Propositions: Networks of Complete Ideas
a.
ACT (Anderson)
i. Three Memory Systems
ii. The Network Structure of a Proposition: Nodes &
Links
iii. Connecting Propositions in a Network
iv. The Activation Processing Assumption
v. Some Evidence
a) Ratcliff & McKoon: Episodic Priming
b) Anderson: Fact Retrieval Experiments & Positive Fan
Effects
b. ACT*
i. Three Fundamental Cognitive Units
ii. Tangled Hierarchies
3.
Scripts & Schemas (Shank & Abelson) (see
also pp. 272 - 286 in the text)
a.
Organizational Structure
b. Partial Match Model
i. Activating a Script or Schema
ii. Principle of Instantiation
iii. How Scripts Guide Inference
iv. Scripts & False Memory
c. Scripts, Act, & Act*
i. Smith, Adams, & Schorr: Paradox of the Expert
ii. Anderson & Reder: Thematic Subnodes
iii. Scripts as Lists in ACT*
iv. Radvansky & Zacks: Fan Effects & Mental Models
d. Potential Script Mechanisms
i. Five Ways (Brewer & Treyens) in which Scripts/Schemas Can
Influence Memory
a) attentional hypothesis
b) framework hypothesis
c) integration hypothesis
d) retreival cue hypothesis
e) communication hypothesis
ii. Evidence
a) guiding attention & comprehension: Bransford & Johnson
Experiment 1 (also the balloon exp. on p. 273-274);
Bower, Black, & Turner's priming study (cf. p. 280)
b) testing retrieval cue: Bransford & Johnson Experiment 2
(also
on p. 274)
c) testing retrieval, part 2: Anderson & Pichert (also on p.
275)
d) integration: false memory studies: Sulin & Dooling
(also
on p. 277); Brewer & Treyens
(see also pp. 278-286)
e) communication: Brewer & Treyens; Spiro (real life vs. lab
study)
4.
Perceptual Symbols Model (Barasalou)
a. Amodal vs. Modal Approaches; Why Modal?
b. Beilock & Golden-Meadowa (Psychonomics, 2009)
i. Phase 1: Tower of Hanoi Pretest
ii. Each desc heavier; the last disc very large (two hands to
move)
iii. Phase 2: People explain how they solved (using gestures)
iv. Phase 3: Redo ToH (But weights reversed for half the people)
v. Conclusion 1: "The action components of our gestures influence
problem solving, and not always for the better."
vi. Conclusion 2: Knowledge incorporates motor and visual
components; it isn't amodal!